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The Unholy Trinity: Fat Tails, Tail Dependence,  
and Micro-Correlations 
Carolyn Kousky and Roger M. Cooke 
Abstract 
Recent events in the financial and insurance markets, as well as the looming challenges of a 
globally changing climate point to the need to re-think the ways in which we measure and manage 
catastrophic and dependent risks. Management can only be as good as our measurement tools. To that 
end, this paper outlines detection, measurement, and analysis strategies for fat-tailed risks, tail dependent 
risks, and risks characterized by micro-correlations. A simple model of insurance demand and supply is 
used to illustrate the difficulties in insuring risks characterized by these phenomena. Policy implications 
are discussed. 
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The Unholy Trinity: Fat Tails, Tail Dependence,  
and Micro-Correlations 
Carolyn Kousky and Roger M. Cooke∗ 
1. Introduction 
Managing potential losses is critical to the property insurance company writing 
homeowners policies, the bank underwriting mortgages, the stock market investor, and the 
federal government setting rates for the National Flood Insurance Program. If losses are 
independent and never terribly severe, managers can draw on traditional diversification 
strategies. It doesn’t take the Great Depression or Hurricane Katrina, however, to realize that 
losses are often catastrophic and dependent; our work focuses on these types of risks, which pose 
unique challenges to risk managers. 
In particular, we examine fat tails, tail dependence, and micro-correlations—an “unholy 
trinity” of risk management perils. These are distinct aspects of loss distributions, such as 
damages from a disaster or insurance claims. With fat-tailed losses, the probability declines 
slowly, relative to the severity of the loss. Tail dependence is the propensity of dependence to 
concentrate in the tails, such that severe losses are more likely to happen together. Micro-
correlations are negligible correlations between risks which may be individually harmless, but 
very dangerous when aggregated. These three phenomena—types of catastrophic and dependent 
risks—undermine traditional approaches to risk management.  
At the heart of much risk management is aggregation. Firms hold not one insurance 
policy, or one mortgage, but a portfolio of investments. Holding such bundles offers 
diversification benefits and stabilizes losses. As we will show here, however, this traditional 
approach for managing risks can fail when loss distributions are characterized by fat tails, tail 
dependence, or micro-correlations. If one does not know how to detect these phenomena, it is not 
possible to manage them, such that firms may unwittingly court insolvency and the government 
may be exposed to losses of which they are unaware. 
                                                 
∗ Kousky is a fellow at Resources for the Future and Cooke is Chauncey Starr Senior Fellow at Resources for the 
Future. Address correspondence to: Carolyn Kousky, Resources for the Future, 1616 P Street, NW, Washington, DC 
20036. Email: kousky@rff.org. We would like to thank Mark Heising, Liz Simons, and the Simons Foundation for 
making this work possible.   
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While these phenomena could describe a range of risks, in this paper we focus on 
damages from natural disasters. We use three datasets to show the existence of the unholy trinity 
in disaster damages and to develop methods for their detection, measurement, and analysis. We 
then illustrate the challenges for insuring these types of risks with a simple model of the demand 
and supply of insurance. The datasets include: flood insurance claims data from the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), crop insurance indemnities paid data from the United States 
Department of Agriculture’s Risk Management Agency,
1 and the SHELDUS database, 
maintained by the Hazards and Vulnerability Research Group at the University of South 
Carolina,
2 which has county-level damages and fatalities from weather events.  
The next three sections of the paper describe sequentially the three phenomena of fat 
tails, tail dependence, and micro-correlations, providing examples of their importance. We use 
the above mentioned datasets to develop techniques for measuring and analyzing these three 
types of risks. Section 5 then presents a model of the demand and supply of insurance for 
catastrophic and dependent risks, demonstrating the pitfalls of insuring distributions 
characterized by the unholy trinity. Policy implications and potential remedies are discussed. 
2. Fat Tails 
Fat tails were introduced in mathematical finance in 1963 by Benoit Mandelbrot to 
describe cotton price changes (Mandelbrot 1963). Since then, evidence has accumulated that 
many types of damages, from financial losses to natural disasters, are best characterized by 
distributions with fat tails (e.g., Mandelbrot 2004; Malamud and Turcotte 2006; Latchman, 
Morgan and Aspinall 2008). The uncertainty surrounding climate change impacts may also 
generate fat tails, as in Weitzman’s (2008) analysis, where updating a non-informative prior 
yields a fat-tailed posterior damage distribution. The precise mathematical definition of tail 
obesity is rather subtle (Resnick 2007), but a working notion is that damage variable X has a fat 
tail if, for sufficiently large values x, the probability that X exceeds x is kx
-α, for some constants 
α, k > 0. The variable α is referred to as the tail index or tail parameter.  
                                                 
1 We would like to thank Ed Pasterick and Tim Scoville for providing the NFIP data and Barbara Carter for 
providing the crop data. 
2 Information on SHELDUS is available online: http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvri/products/SHELDUS.aspx. The damage 
and fatality estimates in SHELDUS are minimum estimates as the approach to compiling the data always takes the 
most conservative estimates (for further discussion, see: Cutter, Gall and Emrich 2008).  Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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From this definition, it is clear that there are degrees of tail fatness. The m-th moment is 
infinite if α ≤ m. If α ≤  1, we say the tail is “Super Fat” and the mean or first moment is infinite. 
Of course, on N samples from such a distribution, the average of the N sample values will be 
finite, but it increases with N. “Really Fat” tails, with 1 < α ≤ 2, have a defined mean, but an 
infinite variance. The sample mean for these distributions also has infinite variance no matter 
how many samples are drawn.  
 When either the mean or the variance is infinite, two types of problems emerge for risk 
managers: (1) historical data will be a poor guide for the future, and (2) the tails of aggregations 
are also fat. To illustrate (1), suppose an insurance company wishes to assess the risk of flood 
damage to property in Dade County, Florida. They might look to the historical record and tally 
the total claims divided by the total value insured or the total number of policies. Any such 
method presumes that the historical average gives a good estimate of the risk. If the loss 
distribution is really fat, however, they must contend with the fact that the historical average 
itself has infinite variance, no matter how many years are averaged, and will thus not be stable. 
For problem (2), consider that a (re-)insurer may traditionally diversify his risk by combining 
insurance policies from multiple geographic locations. If the losses per area per year are drawn 
independently from a loss distribution with finite variance, then the sum of many such losses will 
tend to be normal, and thus thin-tailed, according to the central limit theorem. However, if the 
loss distributions have infinite variance, then the central limit theorem does not apply; instead the 
sums converge to a stable law which has the same tail behavior as the summands. Aggregation 
does not yield thinner tails. We will elaborate further on these points below.  
Measuring tail obesity in loss distributions presents challenges. The best-known approach 
is the Hill estimator, which estimates the tail parameter, α, of a Pareto distributed variable, X, or 
any variable whose tail beyond some threshold xk follows a Pareto distribution. If Xi…Xn are 
independent versions of X, the Hill estimator based on xk from a sample {x1,…xn} is the 
maximum-likelihood estimator of 1/α given by (see: Resnick 2007): 
 
(1)    (∑i; xi > xk log(xi) – log(xk)) / #[i | xi > xk]. 
 
This works well if the data are indeed drawn from a Pareto distribution. If the data are not 
Pareto, but still fat-tailed, the behavior of the Hill estimator is notoriously unstable for large 
thresholds (Brielant et al. 2005; Resnick 2007), rendering its use in practical risk management 
problematic. This is seen when using the Hill estimator on property damage data for all natural Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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hazards in the United States over the years 1960 to 2007. Damages are from the SHELDUS 
database in constant 2007 dollars. Figure 1 shows a Hill plot of this data. The tail index 
estimated from the top n order statistics is plotted against n (order 0 is the largest). Is this tail 
Super Fat or only Really Fat? This Hill index is inconclusive. Bierlant et al. (2005) review 
attempts to improve the Hill estimator. 
Figure 1: Hill plot for US property damages from natural disasters 
 
 
Another diagnostic of tail obesity are mean excess plots. If variable X has cumulative 
distribution function F then the mean excess curve for X is defined as: 
 
(2)  G(x0) = E(X – x0 | X > x0).                        
 
It is well known that the mean excess curve for the Pareto distribution is linear, G(x0) = 
(x0+k)/(α–1) (McNiel, Frey and Embrechts 2005). Note that G(x0) is not defined for α=1. For a 
finite ordered sample, x1 < x2 ,…< xn, the sample mean excess plot gives the values: 
 
(3)  {xi , g(xi)};  g(xi) = Σ j = i,...n-1 (xj+1-xi)/(n-i); i = 1,…n-1; g(xn) = 0. 
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Evidently for any constant c, g(cxi) = cg(xi); it is therefore convenient to standardize such plots 
by dividing all xi’s by the largest, so that  xn=1 (g is also invariant under shifts of location, but 
these are not considered here).  
Whereas the theoretical mean excess curve for a Pareto variable is a straight line, the 
empirical mean excess plot is not. Figure 2 shows standardized, sample mean excess plots for 
Super Fat, Really Fat, and Meso-Fat (infinite third moment) Paretos, where the xi’s are obtained 
by inverting uniformly spaced percentiles:  
 
(4)  Pr{X > xj} = (1+xj)
-α
 = 1 – j / 1001; j = 1,…1000.               
 
Evidently, these plots are not linear. For instance, a Pareto with tail index of 2 does not have a 
sample mean excess plot that is linear with slope 1 as the mean excess curve would be (middle 
plot in Figure 2). The mean excess curve for a Pareto with a tail index of 1 has infinite slope, but 
of course the sample mean excess plot will not (far right plot of Figure 2). Figure 2 quickly 
disabuses us of the idea that tail obesity can be measured by eyeballing a sample mean excess 
plot. 
Figure 2: Standardized mean excess plots for inverse percentiles of Pareto variables, 
with tail index α =3 (left), 2 (center), 1 (right) 
 
We’ve noted that whether a tail has infinite variance is of key concern for risk managers 
as this determines whether the tail will thin under aggregation. As such, a simple diagnostic for 
whether data comes from a distribution with infinite variance would be useful. Drawing on the 
behavior of sums of fat-tailed variables, we propose looking at the speed of collapse of the mean 
excess plot as variables are aggregated. Suppose we draw 5,000 samples from a Pareto Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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distribution with tail index α = 1. The slope of the theoretical mean excess plot is infinite, but the 
sample mean excess plot will look like a noisy version of the right-most plot in Figure 2. 
Suppose we now form random groups of ten distinct samples and sum the samples in each group. 
We call this operation “aggregation by 10.” Since independent sums of these variables converge 
to a stable law with the same tail index (Resnick 2007), we might expect that the mean excess of 
the aggregation by 10 should resemble the original mean excess. Indeed it does. Figure 3 
compares this standardized mean excess plot for α=1 with aggregations by 10 and by 50, for 
Paretos with tail index α=1,2,3, and also exponential variables. Sums of independent 
exponentials converge quickly to a normal with a descending mean excess plot; indeed for 
aggregation by 50, the aggregands’ values are less disperse. Index α=2 is the highest index with 
infinite variance. Of course the finite sample has finite variance and aggregation by 50 produces 
a descending mean excess plot. For α=3, aggregation by 10 largely eliminates the positive slope.  
Figure 3: Standardized mean excess plots, with aggregations by 10 and 50, for Pareto 
distributions with α= 1,2, 3 and for the exponential distribution  
 Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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This same approach can be used to examine the tail behavior of actual loss data. We look 
at crop indemnities paid per county and National Flood Insurance Program claims by county for 
the years 1980 to 2006. Over this time period, there has been substantial growth in exposure to 
flood risk, particularly in coastal counties. To remove the effect of growing exposure, we divide 
the claims by personal income estimates from the Bureau of Economic Accounts (BEA).
3 Thus, 
we study flood claims per dollar income, by county and year.
4 The crop loss claims are not 
exposure adjusted, as a proxy for exposure is not obvious, and exposure growth is less of a 
concern.  
Figure 4: Mean excess plots for US crop loss (above)  
and exposure corrected flood claims (below) 
 
Note: The vertical axis gives mean excess loss, given loss at least as large as the horizontal axis. The upper right 
picture shows crop payment mean excess for random aggregations of 10 counties. The lower right picture shows 
flood claims mean excess for random aggregations of 50 counties. 
 
                                                 
3 Income data was not avilable for Guam, Puerto Rico, or St. Croix, so these are dropped from our dataset. Further, 
the income data for some counties in Virigina was for aggregations of counties. These are also dropped as they 
cannot match cleanly with our flood claims data. 
4 This arguably may not be the most appropriate normalization. The purchase of flood policies has grown over time, 
for instance, and this is not accounted for here. The mean excess plot for inflation-adjusted claims paid divided by 
the number of claims in each county, however, shows a similar mean excess plot to the one in Figure 4. Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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Figure 4 shows each county-year as a realization of a single random variable. The left 
graphs depict mean excess plots for crop (above) and exposure adjusted flood insurance claims 
(below). This data is not standardized, and the unit slope lines have been added. Whereas the 
sample mean excess plot for crop payments suggests a slope less than 1, the sample mean excess 
plot for flood claims suggests an infinite variance. The mean excess plot of a random aggregation 
by 10 for crop losses in Figure 4 (upper right) shows a decreasing slope. Compare this with 
Figure 4 (lower right) showing the mean excess of a random aggregation by 50 of exposure 
adjusted flood losses. Here, aggregation does not thin the tail significantly; the mean excess plot 
is self similar. The same picture emerges in when looking again at the SHELDUS data for all 
natural disasters in the U.S. (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Self similarity under aggregation of US property damage mean excess plots 
 
Figures 4 and 5 suggest that the behavior of loss data under random aggregation gives 
valuable insight into tail obesity. In particular, the speed with which the mean excess curve 
collapses under random aggregation appears to be a useful indicator of whether the data come 
from a distribution with infinite variance—the most critical information for risk managers. 
Unlike the Hill estimator, this indicator is not an estimate of behavior at infinity, but depends 
only on the finite sample we have before us, making it much more useful in practice. Moreover, 
it is not an estimate of a parameter in a theoretical model of the data, but a feature of the data 
itself.  
While these tools are useful, applying them to appropriately corrected exposure data is 
critical. Risk is damage per unit exposure. Naïve examinations of risk will ignore exposure, but 
changes in exposure can alter risk assessments, sometimes fundamentally. As a simple 
illustration, Figure 6 shows the mean excess plot of deaths per county-year from natural disasters Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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in the US from 1995-2007.
5  For each point x on the horizontal axis, the plot shows the expected 
excess number of fatalities in county-years having at least x fatalities. The left hand curve is very 
steep, indicating a very fat-tailed distribution. Does this mean that the physical impacts from 
disasters are fat-tailed, or that population is concentrated in harm’s way leading to fat-tailed 
damages? The graph on the right shows the same data, but now the fatalities per county are 
divided by the population of the county. It is a different dimensioning of risk and shows a very 
different result. Whereas the risk per county is very fat tailed, the risk per person is not. The high 
damages are coming from disasters which hit high population areas, not from the disaster 
intensity as such. Which figure is most appropriate depends on our risk management problem.  
Figure 6: Mean excess plots of fatalities per county-year,  
without (left) and with (right) correction for population 
 
3. Tail Dependence 
Tail dependence refers to the tendency of dependence between two random variables to 
concentrate in the extreme values. For loss distributions, we are interested in dependence of non-
negative variables concentrating in the extreme high values, or upper tail dependent (UTD). 
Upper tail dependence of variables X and Y is defined as the limit (if it exists) of the probability 
that X exceeds its r-percentile, given that Y exceeds its r-percentile, as r goes to 100. 
Hurricane Katrina vividly demonstrated tail dependence across damage types and 
insurance lines. The storm not only caused wind and rain damage, but damage from breached 
                                                 
5 This data is from SHELDUS and does not include fatality estimates from Katrina. Other estimates in SHELDUS 
seem to be underestimates of deaths reported in other sources. The data is used here merely for purposes of 
illustration. Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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levees and storm surge, power outages, fires that could not be put out, business interruptions, 
toxic spills, a rise in energy costs from damage to rigs and refineries, and increased costs of 
reconstruction (this latter effect is referred to as “demand surge,” see: Hallegatte, Boissonnade, 
Schlumberger et al. 2008). After Katrina, some lines of insurance that had not been heavily hit in 
other catastrophes saw many claims; among them cargo, inland marine and recreational 
watercraft, floating casinos, onshore energy, automobile, worker’s comp, health, and life 
insurance (RMS 2005), demonstrating the tail dependence across these lines of business. The 
9/11 terrorist attacks also demonstrated that for extreme events, multiple lines become affected 
(Riker 2004). When these tail dependencies are not considered, the tail exposure of an insurance 
company can be severely underestimated. 
If X and Y are independent, their tail dependence is zero. If their tail dependence is 
positive, then when one variable takes on an extreme value, it is more likely the other variable 
will as well. Note that UTD does not depend on the marginal distributions of X and Y; if we 
apply any 1-to-1 transformation to X, say X* = X
1/N, N ∈
 Գ, X > 0 (which will thin X’s tail), then 
UTD(X*,Y) = UTD(X,Y). UTD has no simple relation to the standard Pearson correlation 
coefficient. For example, normal variables with any correlation ρ strictly between -1 and 1, have 
zero tail dependence (McNiel, et al. 2005). 
Tail dependence can be seen in loss data. Wind damage and water damage are insured 
separately in the United States. The former is covered under homeowners policies or state wind 
pools and the latter is covered by the federal National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Flood 
damage and wind damage are often independent; a rising river does not necessarily mean terrible 
winds and a storm with high winds may not have enough rain to cause flood damage. A severe 
hurricane, however, causes both. This suggests that wind and water insurance payments may be 
tail dependent in a hurricane-prone state such as Florida. Figure 7 shows this is indeed the case. 
Wind payments from the state insurer Citizens Property Insurance Corporation were grouped by 
county and month for the years 2002–2006, as were NFIP flood claims (all are in constant 2007 
dollars). Each damage dataset was ranked, with the highest rank standardized to 1, and the ranks 
plotted against each other. The abundance of points in the upper right quadrant of Figure 7 shows 
that high flood damages and high wind claims occur together, indicative of tail dependence.  
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Figure 7: Tail dependence in wind and water claims, Florida 2002–2006 
 
Note: Points of zero damages were removed, so rank axes do not begin at zero. 
The joint distribution of the percentiles of two random variables is called a “copula,” and 
tail dependence is a property of the copula (for more information on copulae, see: Genest and 
MacKay 1986; Nelson 1999; Embrechts 2007). Copulae are useful tools for studying high 
dimensional multivariate distributions, as they allow us to separate the representation of 
dependence from the representation of the univariate marginal distributions (Kurowicka and 
Cooke 2006). Different marginal distributions can be combined in different dependence 
structures by choosing different copulae. The fact that tail dependence is a property of the copula 
immediately shows that there is no general relation between fat tails and tail dependence. These 
are separate issues. Current research focuses on the relation between tail dependence and 
multivariate extreme value copulae (Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts and Nešlehová 2005; Joe, Li 
and Nikoloulopoulos 2008). 
Under certain conditions, tail dependence can grow as variables are aggregated. If the 
random variables are thought to be insurance policies, this ballooning of tail dependence will 
again put limits on diversification. As one simple example, consider a basic model of 
dependence in which a set of random variables X1…Xn are symmetrically correlated with a 
“latent variable.” The degree of correlation between the variables will then depend on the chosen 
copula. If a tail independent copula is chosen, such as the normal copula, aggregation will not Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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increase tail dependence. If a weakly tail dependent copula is chosen, however, then the tail 
dependence can balloon upon aggregation.  
One version of this is called the “Lp symmetric process,” which is widely used in 
reservoir management, maintenance optimization, and deterioration modeling (van Noortwijk 
1996). In this case, the latent variable is the scale factor, and the Xi’s are conditionally 
independent gamma transform variables characterized by a fixed shape and a scale factor which 
is uncertain. Given a scale value, the variables are independent, but lack of knowledge of the 
scale factor induces a global correlation between the Xi’s. In the simple case of conditionally 
independent exponentials with gamma distributed scale factor with shape υ, the unconditional 
distribution of each Xi is Pareto.  
If we consider distinct sums of N such variables, they have upper tail dependence given 
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which grows with N. This model is interesting because it is widely applied and it is one of the 
few in which we can actually compute all relevant quantities. We can see tail dependence 
emerging from summing familiar random variables.  
In general, computations of sums of tail dependent variables are intractable; simulation, 
however, is rather easy. We choose the correlation ρ(Xi, Latent) = 0.1; the correlation between Xi 
and Xj will depend on the copula chosen to realize this correlation, but will be on the order of 
0.01. Figure 8 shows four percentile scatter plots using a Gumbel copula having weak upper tail 
dependence. Figure 8a is simply between X1 and X2, and the correlation 0.02 is imperceptible. 
Figure 8b shows the scatter plot of distinct sums of 10 variables. The correlation between them 
of 0.14 is scarcely visible, but we do see some darkening of the upper right corner. In Figure 8c 
and 8d we see the scatter plots of sums of 20 and 40 variables respectively. Now the upper tail 
dependence becomes quite evident.  
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Figure 8: Tail dependence, Gumbel copula 
(a) X1 × X2 : Gumbel; ρ = 0.02        (b) Σ
10 Xi × Σ
10 Xj: Gumbel; ρ = 0.14 
 
(c) Σ
20 Xi × Σ
20 Xj: Gumbel; ρ = 0.25    (d) Σ
40 Xi × Σ
40 Xj: Gumbel; ρ = 0.40 
 
 
To illustrate how the aggregate tail dependence depends on the copula, Figure 9 shows 
the same model as in Figure 8, but with the elliptical copula
6 in 9a and the Normal copula in 9b. 
In both of these, there is no discernable tail dependence. 
 
                                                 
6 The elliptical copula concentrates on an elliptical surface to induce the required correlation, see Kurowicka and 
Cooke (2006). It is of interest mainly because it is analytically tractable, is related to the normal copula, yet has 
markedly different properties.  Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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Figure 9: Elliptical and Normal copulae – no tail dependence 
(a) Σ
40 Xi × Σ
40 Xj: Elliptical; ρ = 0.40        (b) Σ
40 X × , Σ
40 Xj: Normal; ρ = 0.31 
 
Figures 8 and 9 suggest that the way to detect tail dependence is to look at disjunct sums, 
as we saw earlier with measures for tail obesity of damage data. Initial work with monthly, 
county-level NFIP claims data in the state of Florida suggests this approach can be a useful 
detection method. If we consider two random groups of five different counties, and make a 
scatter plot of the percentiles of their monthly losses, the left plot of Figure 10 emerges. The 
points along the axes correspond to months in which no losses were reported in these counties. 
We may discern a weak tendency for points to cluster in the upper right corner. This tendency 
grows appreciably stronger if we take two random groups of 30 different counties, as in the right 
plot.  
Figure 10: Percentile scatter plots of random aggregations of 5 (left) and 30 (right)  
Florida counties, monthly flood losses 
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4. Micro-Correlations  
Micro-correlations are small, positive correlations between variables. The difficulty with 
micro-correlations is that they could so easily go undetected. One might not readily assume that 
fires in Australia and floods in California are correlated, for example, but El Niño events induce 
exactly this coupling. These tiny correlations are amplified by aggregation, undermining 
common diversification strategies.  
The ballooning under aggregation is illustrated by a very simple formula that should be 
on the first page of every insurance text book, but is not. Let X1,…, XN and Y1,…, YN be two sets 
of random variables with the same average variance σ
2 and average covariance C (within and 
between sets). The correlation of the sums of the X’s and the sum of the Y’s is easily found to be: 
 
(6)  ∑∑ − +
=
C N N N
C N





ρ .  
 
This evidently goes to 1 as N grows, if C is non-zero and σ
2 is finite. If all variables are 
independent, then C=0, and the correlation in (6) is zero. The variance of ΣXi is always non-
negative; if the σ
2 and C are constant for sufficiently large N, it is easy to see that C ≥ 0.  
The amplification of correlation can be seen most dramatically in the flood insurance 
claim data. Suppose we randomly draw pairs of US counties and compute their correlation. The 
green histogram in Figure 11 shows 500 such correlations. The average correlation is 0.04. A 
few counties have high, positive correlations, but the bulk is around zero. Indeed, based on the 
sampling distribution for the normal correlation coefficient, correlations less than 0.37 in 
absolute value would not be statistically distinguishable from zero at the 5% significance level. 
91% of these correlations fall into that category.  
 Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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Figure 11: US flood claims, correlations-of-1 (green),  
correlations-of-100 (blue), and correlations-of-500 (red) 
 
Instead of looking at the correlations between two randomly chosen counties, consider 
summing 100 randomly chosen counties and correlating this with the sum of another, distinct set 
of 100 randomly chosen counties. If we repeat this 500 times, the blue histogram in Figure 11 
results; the average of 500 such correlations-of-100 is 0.23. The red histogram depicts 500 
correlations-of-500, their average value is 0.71. This dramatic increase in correlation is a result 
of the micro-correlations between the individual variables. Compare Figure 11 with Figure 12, in 
which each county is assigned an independent uniform variable, for each of 30 years. The 
correlations-of-1 and correlations-of-500 are effectively the same. Aggregation amplifies micro-
correlations. 
 Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
17 
 
Figure 12: Correlations-of-1 and correlations-of-500,  
for 30 realizations of independent uniform variables 
 
US Crop loss data shows stronger micro-correlations, and comparable levels of 
amplification are reached at aggregations by 100, as shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: US Crop losses, correlations-of-1 (green),  
correlations-of-50 (blue), and correlations-of-100 (red) 
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5. Insurance and Policy Implications 
Catastrophic and dependent risks are expensive to insure and this can lead to a 
breakdown in the insurance market. Consider i=1…N policyholders in a given region or line of 
business. While the insurer will be offering other types of coverage besides homeowners 
policies, such as automobile insurance or business interruption insurance, for example, we focus 
just on the homeowners policies. Each year a homeowner faces a potential loss of Li. An insurer 
offers coverage to homeowners at a price equal to q per dollar of coverage (rates may vary across 
lines or regions, but individual-specific rates are not possible). 
The basic theoretical model of an individual’s decision to purchase insurance (e.g., 
Mossin 1968) is formalized in most microeconomics and decision analysis textbooks. Adapted to 
our current set-up, let p be the probability of disaster, let wi be the individual’s total wealth, let αi 
be the amount of dollars of insurance purchased, and let Li and q be defined as in the previous 
paragraph. The expected utility (EU) for a potential consumer of insurance is then given by 
(deviations from EU theory discussed below): 
 
(7)  EU = (1 – p)u(wi – αiq) + pu(wi – αiq – Li + αi). 
 
The risk-averse homeowner chooses α by maximizing expected utility (subject to the 
constraint that αi ≥0), giving the first-order condition, assuming an interior solution, (where α* is 
the optimal amount of insurance purchased): 
 
(8)  -q(1 – p)u  ́(wi - αi* q) + p(1-q)u  ́(wi - αi*q - Li + αi*) = 0. 
 
Assume insurance is priced actuarially fairly, (ignoring transaction and marketing costs), such 
that p = q. In this case, we get the well-known result that a risk averse consumer, facing actuarial 
rates, will fully insure: αi = Li. With this set-up in hand, we turn now to the insurer’s problem. 
The optimization problem of a solvency-constrained insurer can be modeled as follows. 
Let α=∑ αi* be the portfolio of policies—the total exposure—held by the insurer.  Let total Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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claims for the insurance company—which will vary by the portfolio the company holds—be 
given by Cα=∑ci. An insurer has access to some level of assets to support losses, given by A, and 
may also purchase reinsurance, K, at cost r per dollar covered.
7  We ignore marketing and 
transaction expenses here, although obviously prices will need to be high enough to cover these 
costs. For a solvency constrained insurer, the firm cannot spend more on claims than the total of 
revenue (Σqαi), assets, and reinsurance. Following Kleindorfer and Klein (2002), expected 
profits for the insurer, E[Π(q, A, K)], are thus given by: 
 
(9)  E[Π(q, A, K)= Σqαi – rK – E[Min(Cα, Σqαi + (1-r)K +A)]. 
 
The insurer seeks to keep the probability of insolvency below some target level λ.
8  F(Cα) 
is the cumulative distribution function of claims an insurer faces for a given portfolio. The 
insurer will then maximize expected profits subject to the following constraint: 
 
(10)  Pr(Cα > Σqαi + (1 – r)K +A) ≤ λ. 
 
Define Sα,λ to be the required capital, or surplus, the insurer must have to cover claims that will 
occur with probability 1- λ when holding a given portfolio α. Then:   
 
(11) F
-1(1-λ) = Sα,λ. 
 
If the policies within the portfolio are characterized by the three phenomena discussed 
here, more surplus will be required than if they are independent. This is illustrated in Figure 14. 
                                                 
7 This is, of course, a very simplified construction of reinsurance. For alternate forms of reinsurance, see Ladoucette 
and Teugels (2006). 
8 Here, this probability is taken to be exogenous, perhaps set by capital regulations. For instance, in the EU, 
beginning in 2012, insurance companies will be regulated through the Solvency II regulations.  The Solvency 
Capital Requirement component of the regulations takes a Value-at-Risk (VAR) approach, whereby an insurer must 
keep the probability of insolvency below a certain level, currently set at 0.5 percent.   Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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Figure 14a compares the cumulative distribution functions of the sum of 100 lognormal variables 
(as a proxy for an insurance portfolio) when they are mutually independent (green) and mutually 
correlated at 0.01 (red), without tail dependence (using the normal copula). This shows that for 
any conceivable target solvency probability, the required surplus is greater for the micro-
correlated variables. Figure 14b shows similar graphs, except that the correlation is realized by a 
tail dependent copula (Gumbel). The amplification of tail dependence noted in section 3 causes 
the high quantiles in figure 14b to increase dramatically. This means that much more capital will 
be required, even for very low values of ρ, when the variables are tail dependent compared to 
when they are independent. For fat-tailed lines, more capital is also needed as shown in figures 
14c and 14d. These figures show sums of fat-tailed variables (Pareto variables with tail index of 
2), with a micro correlation (red, c) and tail dependence, (red, d). 
 
Figure 14: Surplus for independent and dependent sums of lognormal variables (a, b) and 
Pareto variables (c, d); mutual correlation 0.01 realized with normal copula (a, c) and 
gumbel copula (b, d) 
   a  b 
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         c  d 
 
In these cases of catastrophic and dependent insurance lines, maintaining the same 
probability of solvency means increasing premiums, either to raise capital directly to meet the 
surplus requirement or to finance the purchase of reinsurance. Two potential difficulties emerge. 
First, state regulators may limit q. It has been noted by insurance scholars that state insurance 
commissioners in the US—who have the power to regulate premiums—tend to weight low prices 
and availability of policies more heavily than solvency considerations or management of 
catastrophe risk (Klein and Wang 2007). If insurers cannot charge prices that they feel are 
sustainable, they will leave the market (Klein 2005). This creates the need for so-called residual 
market mechanisms. These are programs set up by states to provide insurance policies to those 
people who cannot find a policy in the voluntary market. Many residual market mechanisms 
have underpriced insurance, perhaps out of ignorance of the fat tailed or dependent nature of a 
risk, due to a lack of foresight, or from political pressure, creating higher exposures for states. 
Florida has been particularly troubled in this regard. 
Second, and more problematically for insurance markets, homeowners might not be 
willing to pay the higher premiums required for catastrophic and dependent lines. To get a first-
order estimate, assume the homeowner’s utility function is given by ln(wealth). Assume also that 
the homeowner fully insurers or does not insure at all. Of course, in reality, insurance is not an 
all or nothing decision, and the homeowner can choose to partially insure. Indeed, when q > p, Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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from equation (8), a risk averse homeowner will choose αi* < Li.
9  Still, to get a better 
understanding of how catastrophic and dependent risks could lead to a break down in the 
insurance market, assume, for sake of illustration, that the homeowner chooses αi* = Li, and that 
the loss is equal to the value of their home. The homeowner faces two constraints. The first is 
that the utility from insurance must be greater than the utility without insurance or: 
 
(12) ln(wi – Liq) ≥ (1 – p)ln(wi) + p ln(wi – Li). 
 
Note that when the homeowner fully insurers, their total wealth is the same with or 
without a disaster, since loss is fully compensated by the insurance company. Let q = xp. This 
allows us to focus on x, or the multiple of expected loss rate that a homeowner would be willing 
to pay for insurance. Also, set wi=1 and let Li thus be the fraction of wealth that the homeowner’s 
home represents, which we assume is the same as the fraction of wealth at risk. Making these 








i) 1 ( 1 − −
≤ . 
Second, the owner cannot spend more on insurance than their disposable wealth, which is 
simply their total wealth, wi, minus the value of their home, which is equivalent to the potential 
loss they face. Again, set q=xp and wi=1. Thus, their budget constraint is given by: 
 
(14) Li x p ≤ 1 – Li. 
                                                 
9 This can be seen by rearranging the first order condition in (8) to give: u’(w - αi,s*qs) = [ps(1-qs)/ qs(1-ps)]u’(w- 
αi,sqs - Li + αi,s). For qs>ps, the term in the brackets on the right-hand side of the equation is less than 1. This implies 
that u’(w- αi,sqs - Li + αi,s)> u’(w - αi,s*qs). Since for a risk averse consumer, u’ is decreasing in wealth, we have: w- 
αi,sqs - Li + αi,s< w - αi,s*qs Æ αi,s*<L. 
10 Note that if Li=0, then this expression is undefined. Using L’Hôpital’s Rule, the limit of this expression as the loss 
approaches zero is 1. This makes intuitive sense. As the loss gets smaller and smaller, homeowners will be willing to 
pay less and less above the expected loss. At the limit, x goes to 1, indicating an unwillingess to pay more than the 
expected loss (it just so happens that at a loss of zero, the homeowner would not actually insure anyway). Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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For a given probability of disaster, we can plot these two constraints to determine the 
range of values for x and Li for which a homeowner would insure. This is shown in Figure 15 for 
p = 0.1 (left) and p = 0.01 (right). A homeowner will only insure when values of x (y-axis) and Li 
(x-axis) are below both curves. As the probability of a disaster decreases, the income constraint 
relaxes, as seen in 15 (right), since insurance is cheaper for lower probability risks for a fixed 
loss level.11 Figure 16 shows our constraints also as a function of p. For a homeowner with more 
wealth apart from their home, the fraction at risk will be lower and thus the budget constraint 
will be less binding. On the other hand, the utility constraint becomes more binding since 
wealthier homeowners will prefer to self-insure. Note that the low slope of the utility constraint 
for multipliers in the region 1 to 3 means that a small change in this multiplier corresponds with 
a large shift in fractional wealth at risk for which insurance is rational.  Similar results emerge 









                                                 
11 As the probability decreases, the utility constraint shifts out very slightly. This is because even though as the 
probabiltiy decreases a homeowner is willing to pay less for insurance, the graphs in Figure 15 are plotting x, not q. 
For a given q, as p decreases, c must increase. Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
24 




Figure 16: Homeowner budget and utility constraints as a function of wealth fraction at 
risk and probability of loss 
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Figures 15 and 16 show that our risk averse homeowner will not pay much more than a 
couple times expected loss for insurance—and this is when a very large portion of wealth is at 
risk. How does this compare to the rates needed to be charged by insurers facing risks 
characterized by our three phenomena? Let us fix p = 0.01, and consider an insurance company 
that writes 10,000 policies. Assume that the insurance company has set λ=0.005 (this is the draft 
Solvency II requirement). The portfolio of 10,000 policies will follow a distribution that is 
approximately normal. If the policies are independent, then it is easy to calculate that the 
company must charge each policy a fair price multiplier of 1.26 times the expected loss in order 
to meet their solvency constraint. Referring to Figure 15(b), the utility constraint is satisfied if 
the fractional wealth at risk is greater than 0.375, and the budget constraint is satisfied if it is less 
than 0.988. Individuals whose fractional wealth at risk is outside this interval are either too rich 
or too poor to render insurance a rational option. Suppose that each pair of insurance policies had 
a small correlation of 0.001. Such a small correlation would be virtually imperceptible; however, 
the multiplier needed to meet the surplus requirement increases to 1.85 and the interval of 
fractional wealth at risk for which insurance is rational shrinks to [0.755, 0.982]. If the pair wise 
correlation rose to 0.01—still negligible by any reasonable standard—the multiplier is 3.58 and 
interval for which insurance is rational is empty.  
While a great deal of literature lays blame for failing insurance markets on the 
irrationality of those at risk, this simple analysis suggests that under even micro-correlated risks, 
insurance may not be rational for many people at risk, if solvency constraints are imposed.  Since 
tail dependent and fat-tailed risks also require more surplus, similar results can be expected for 
these types of risks, as well.  The extra loading required to cover fat tailed, micro-correlated, or 
tail dependent lines can be substantial since for these types of risks, bundling policies does not 
offer the benefits it does for thin tailed and independent risks. In some cases, therefore, insurance 
does not provide enough of a benefit to homeowners to pay the required loadings or becomes too 
expensive as homeowners bump against their budget constraint. In these situations, no amount of 
homeowner education or outreach activities will increase demand.  
Of course, the situation will be exacerbated by the well-documented biases individuals 
exhibit when evaluating low-probability risks (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982). In the 
simple model presented here, homeowners are assumed to know the probability and loss they 
face with certainty. In reality, these are often unknown and in forming subjective assessments 
about low-probability risks, homeowners have been found to exhibit a set of biases, such as 
treating low-probability risks as zero-probability and being overly optimistic about losses (e.g., Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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Camerer and Kunreuther 1989). For fat-tailed risks, homeowners could also be estimating 
expected loss based on only a few years of their past experience.  If these were years with low 
losses, it will lead them to incorrectly believe premiums should be low. There is already a 
documented bias toward individuals assuming that small samples are representative (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1982); the impact of this will be even more pernicious with fat tails. These types 
of biases can lead to sub-optimally low levels of insurance, but the simple model here suggest a 
bigger problem may simply be the inherent difficulty in insuring catastrophic and dependent 
risks due to the required loadings. 
Thus, either because the homeowner does not value insurance at the price offered, or due 
to income constraints or behavioral biases, the insurance market for catastrophic and dependent 
risks may break down. Insurance, however, generates positive externalities. Insured home- and 
business-owners are more likely to have the funds to rebuild and to do so quickly, generating 
economic spillover effects in the community. As homeowners do not consider the benefits to 
neighbors of insuring, too few people may insure, suggesting a social interest in helping bring 
down the cost of insurance for these risks in order to increase take-up rates. If insurance could be 
provided more cheaply for these risks without threatening the solvency of insurers, it could 
provide both private and public benefits.  
One way the cost of insurance for dependent risks could be brought down is by shifting 
some of the risk to the financial markets, for example, through the use of a catastrophe (cat) 
bond. Cat bonds are issued by (re)insurance companies that set up a separate legal structure 
called a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to issue the bond and invest the proceeds in low-risk 
securities. Investors in the bond receive the interest on the investment as well as some fraction of 
premiums paid by the (re)insurer. If the particular catastrophe the bond is designed for, called the 
trigger, does not occur, investors get their principal back at the end of the time period of the 
bond. If the trigger occurs, the investors lose their money as it is given to the (re)insurer to cover 
claims.  
There are a few reasons, however, to be skeptical about demand for cat bonds and other 
insurance linked securities (ILS). The possibility of total loss means cat bonds are usually given 
a non-investment grade rating, discouraging some investors. This can at least be partially 
overcome by issuing the bond in tranches (Michel-Kerjan and Morlaye 2008), where, for 
example, one tranche has the principle at risk and the other does not, so it receives a higher rating 
(in this layer, repayment of the principle may be delayed if a disaster occurs). Second, the 
modeling used for the pricing of ILS is often difficult for lay people to follow, which again might 
discourage some investors. Finally, it had been argued cat bonds would be attractive to investors Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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since they were likely uncorrelated with the market. This cannot be assumed to be true; a cat 
bond failed to meet an interest payment when Lehman Brothers failed (Hartwig 2009). It likely 
appears that cat bonds and the stock market generally may be tail dependent themselves.  
It has been argued that another mechanism for bringing down the cost of catastrophe 
insurance is allowing for tax-deferred catastrophe reserves (Harrington and Niehaus 2001; 
Milidonis and Grace 2007). Currently, insurance companies must keep catastrophe funds in 
general surplus accounts where they may be depleted, regulators may treat the extra funds as 
reasons for more stringent price regulations, and additional surplus and the investment earnings 
on it are taxed as income (Klein and Wang 2007). Davidson (1998) uses a simple example to 
explain the problem with taxing capital used to pay catastrophe losses as income. He assumes, 
for simplicity, an insurer charges $1,000 (the expected loss) of a 1/10 possibility of a $10,000 
loss. If the $1,000 is taxed in year 1—assuming no losses—then, at a 35% rate, only $650 
remains. This continues through year 9. Then in year 10, assume the loss occurs. The insurer 
does not have enough to cover the loss. Some can be recouped through carry-back provisions, 
and in reality, premiums will increase to account for the taxation, but it means costs are higher. 
To help overcome this problem, insurers could choose to allocate cat funds to a trust or 
separate account where they could accumulate tax-free, and only be withdrawn for payment of 
claims following pre-defined triggers (Davidson 1998). The trigger could be based on specific 
events or firm-specific catastrophic loss levels. Such a reserve could have firm-specific caps 
based on tail Value-at-Risk (VaR) measures or some other tool. There could be provision for use 
of the funds for other purposes conditional on paying the appropriate taxes.  
These mechanisms can potentially lower the cost of policies to a point where more 
homeowners will choose to insure. For fat-tailed and tail dependent risks, however, the expected 
losses that occur with probability less than λ could be quite substantial and these risks are not 
managed by an insurer using VaR approaches. That is, the insurance company will keep the 
solvency probability at λ, but does not care, given that their loss exceeds VaRλ, by how much it 
does so. There is no pressure from consumers for insurers to manage risks beyond VaRλ either, 
since they are protected by consumer guarantee funds—state programs that pay the claims of 
insolvent insurers. As an example of the perverse incentive the funds create, it has been found 
that property-casualty insurers have excessive premium growth the year before insolvency (Bohn 
and Hall 1999). This is because premiums can be a cheap form of borrowing, since claims will 
be paid later, that can be used to make risky investments. This creates, as Bohm and Hall note, a 
“heads-I-win-tails-somebody-else-loses” situation. The excess tail risk is essentially transferred 
to the public.  Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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If regulators chose to do so, the approaches just discussed for lowering the costs of 
insurance could also be used to cover events beyond the solvency probability. Tail dependent 
losses, for example, may create damages in excess of the VaRλ. Cat bonds can be used to cover 
these losses. For instance, in April 2007, Swiss Re structured a cat bond covering flood risk in 
the UK that is triggered if there is flooding in at least four of fifty reference locations (Swiss Re 
2008). Such specially designed ILS may prove useful in managing very low-probability, high-
magnitude losses. 
Another approach to address high loss layers or to overcome the breakdown in the 
insurance market when it is too severe to be handled by the mechanisms just discussed, is for the 
federal government to act as a reinsurer of state residual market mechanisms or private insurers. 
Lewis and Murdoch (1996) have argued for federal excess-of-loss contracts for very high layers 
of coverage because (re)insurers have not been able to effectively diversify catastrophe risk and 
the government can offer greater inter-temporal diversification. The authors suggest industry-
wide triggers to minimize moral hazard. Litan (2006) proposes a pre-funded program 
administered by a quasi-independent group in the Treasury Department to provide reinsurance to 
insurance companies or state plans. Premiums would be risk-based and could be reduced if the 
entity adopted risk reduction measures. Government would only cover losses above a relatively 
high threshold, with lower level losses being covered by private insurance and state and local 
governments. This layered approach, it is argued, will provide incentives for all parties to adopt 
mitigation measures. Cutler and Zeckhauser (1999) note that federal reinsurance could allow 
private market functioning for smaller losses, internalize some loss costs that the government has 
control over, and raise revenues for a service the government may provide anyway.  
Pricing for a federal program designed for losses characterized by our trinity would have 
to be set carefully and vary by state and/or exposure of the insurer to avoid moral hazard. 
Consider Figure 17, which uses the SHELDUS data to examine property damages for the states 
of Alaska (a), Florida (b), and Montana (c). In Alaska, the tail of damages is extremely fat, with 
infinite variance. Florida too, has fat-tailed losses, and they can get to be an order of magnitude 
higher than Alaska. The magnitude of losses in Montana, on the other hand, is quite smaller, and 
thin tailed, as indicated by the decreasing mean excess plot after about $4 million. If each state 
did not face prices appropriate for the risk, there could be inequitable cross-subsidization across 
states and insufficient motivation to adopt mitigation. 
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Figure 17: Mean Excess of Property Damage for (a) Alaska, (b) Florida, (c) Montana 
 
 
Mitigation should be a priority since it can bring down damage levels. The government 
should prefer to lower damage costs as it reduces ex-post aid, minimizes economic impacts, and 
reduces pain and suffering. Homeowners, too, given the uninsurable costs of a disaster, would 
prefer, all else equal, to protect their home against damage rather than face a risk of disaster and 
insure. Many mitigation measures have also proven to be cost effective, paying for themselves in 
reasonable timeframes. Far fewer homes are fortified against disasters, however, than this would 
suggest. Homeowners may fail to mitigate for a variety of reasons: they underestimate or dismiss 
the probability of a disaster, are myopic, do not see or understand the mitigation in place when 
purchasing a home, do not have the necessary upfront costs, do not consider the benefits to their 
neighbors, and/or are not as concerned about disaster losses due to federal aid (Lewis and 
Murdoch 1999; Kunreuther 2006).  
Creative solutions for overcoming these barriers would provide public benefits. One 
option is to require buildings to conform to stringent building codes when a property is 
purchased. The cost of the mitigation can be incorporated into the mortgage. Another option is 
tax breaks for homeowners who mitigate, as is currently being considered by Congress, or 
increasing funding to mitigation grant programs run by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency or states. A more novel approach could be to have government finance fortification, with 
homeowners repaying only when a certain magnitude event occurs or slowly over time, like an 
interest-free loan. Mitigation to thin tails and de-couple risks, however promoted, is likely the 
preferred risk management approach to catastrophic and dependent risks. 
6. Conclusion 
Examination of several datasets of damages from natural disasters in the United States 
shows that they are often characterized by fat tails, tail dependence, and/or micro-correlations. Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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We cannot effectively manage what we do not measure, however, and neglect of these 
phenomena can lead insurers—whether the insurer is a private company, a state, or the federal 
government—to unwittingly expose themselves to much greater risk levels. This paper is a first 
step toward the development of tools to detect, measure, and analyze these three phenomena. If 
the analysis in this paper is correct, the insurance sector may already be bumping up against the 
limit of securitizing natural disaster risks. The current structure of private insurance markets in 
the US may have outlived itself, challenging economists and risk analysts to come up with new 
innovative ways of harnessing market forces to combat risk.  Resources for the Future  Kousky and Cooke 
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